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coverage unless their principal occupation is domestic
service.18
Also, beginning in 1994, farm employers are to use the
same tax threshold and filing procedures as apply to
domestic workers their to domestic farm workers.19 Before
1994, domestic employees hired by farmers were subject to
the thresholds used to determine coverage for agricultural
employees.20 Under those rules, the FICA wage threshold
was reached if the farmer's total farm payroll was $2500 or
more per year or the cash wages paid to an employee were
$150 or more.21 Beginning in 1994, the $1,000 wage
threshold applies and the domestic service reporting
requirements effective for 1995 apply to domestic service
on a farm.22
In conclusion
The 1994 legislation does not provide relief for years
before 1994.  Taxpayers who voluntarily pay domestic
service employment taxes for 1993 and earlier years appear
to be eligible for the Non-filer Initiative under which
penalties are abated for reasonable cause and criminal
prosecutions may not be brought.23
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 427.060 and sought to
avoid a judicial lien against the property which impaired the
exemption. The judgment creditor argued that the lien did
not impair the exemption because no execution of the
judgment had been attempted pre-petition. The court held
that, under Kentucky law, the homestead exemption was
allowed even if no execution was attempted; therefore, the
lien impaired the exemption and was avoidable. In re
Powell, 173 B.R. 338 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1994).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor originally filed for Chapter
13 and claimed a $10,000 homestead exemption. The
confirmed Chapter 13 plan provided for the sale of the
homestead with payment of the proceeds to the creditors
less the exemption amount paid to the debtor. The debtor
failed to make mortgage payments on the residence during
the plan and the secured creditor obtained relief from the
automatic stay to foreclose on the residence. The debtor
converted the case to Chapter 7 one day before the sale
which was completed with $27,000 in surplus. The Chapter
7 trustee objected to the debtor’s exemption, arguing that,
under New York law, a homestead exemption was not
allowed for the proceeds of a foreclosure sale because the
proceeds were personal property. The court held that the
New York law did not apply in this case because the
foreclosure sale occurred after the petition, after the claim
for exemption and after the Chapter 13 plan was confirmed;
therefore, bankruptcy procedure controlled to allow the
debtor’s exemption to continue as to the proceeds of the
sale. In re Bedell, 173 B.R. 463 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISMISSAL. The debtors filed for Chapter 12 in 1991
and over the next three years filed six amended plans in
attempts to overcome the objections of creditors. The court
found that during this time, the debtors sold collateral
without prior approval of the creditor or court, incurred
additional debt without the consent of the court, incurred
additional real estate tax liability and allowed the insurance
on collateral to lapse. The court held that the case should be
dismissed because of unreasonable delay by the debtors and
for bad faith in failing to file a confirmable plan while
causing diminution of the estate. In re Suthers, 173 B.R.
570 (W.D. Va. 1994).
DISPOSABLE INCOME.  The debtors’ Chapter 12
plan provided for payment of all disposable income to
unsecured creditors and prohibited the debtors from
spending more than $15,000 for family expenses during
each plan year. The plan did not project that any disposable
income would be available during the plan. During the plan,
the debtors’ income came primarily from nonfarm jobs held
by the debtors and from rental of the farm and one year
rental of a hog confinement facility. In order to reduce job
traveling expenses, the debtors moved to town and rented a
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second residence. The debtors paid their two children to
provide maintenance services for the rented farm. The hog
confinement facility incurred additional expenses during the
years when it was not operated, in order to keep the facility
in rentable condition. One of the unsecured creditors
objected to the final discharge of the debtors because the
debtors did not distribute all disposable income. The
creditor compared the debtors’ federal income tax returns to
their plan reports and found significant discrepancies
between the reported expenses and claimed deductions. The
court held that once the discrepancies had been shown, the
debtors had the burden of proving that the expenses claimed
were reasonable and related to operating the farm or earning
income. The debtors failed to meet this burden primarily
because the debtors did not keep records sufficiently
detailed to show the purpose of the expenditures. In
particular, the records of the expenses for maintaining the
unrented hog confinement facility were not sufficient to
show the expenses to be necessary for attracting renters and
were not sufficient to show that the expenses were
reasonable in comparison to the expected rent from the
facility. The records also did not show how often the
children worked at maintaining the farm or whether the
wages were reasonable given that the children were still
dependent on the debtors for other basic living expenses.
The court held that the debtors were not entitled to a
discharge because all disposable income had not been
distributed to the unsecured creditors.  In re Meyer, 173
B.R. 419 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. During the debtor’s
Chapter 11 case, the debtor incurred state sales tax liability,
federal withholding tax liability and liability for attorney’s
fees. The trustee had only a limited amount of funds left
over from the estate and proposed to pay these liabilities on
a pro rata basis. The attorney objected, arguing that because
the court had ordered the estate to pay all taxes when due,
the tax liabilities should be paid after the attorney’s fees.
The court held that the taxes were entitled to first priority as
administrative expenses, as were the attorney's fees, and that
the code provided for no change because of an estate’s
violation of a court order. In re Mariner Enter. of
Pennsacola, Inc., 173 B.R. 771 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994).
DISCHARGE.  The IRS filed a claim in the debtor’s
Chapter 11 case for unpaid taxes for 1977 through 1985
when the debtor filed accurate income tax returns but did
not pay the amounts due. The Bankruptcy Court held that
the taxes were dischargeable because the debtor filed
accurate returns and did nothing to prevent the IRS from
collecting the taxes, such as hiding assets. The District
Court reversed, holding that no fraudulent act need be
committed by the debtor in order to deny discharge under
Section 523. The court held that the debtor’s failure to pay
the taxes was a willful attempt to evade taxes because the
debtor knew the taxes were due and the debtor had the
ability to pay the taxes. In re Haas, 173 B.R. 756 (S.D. Ala.
1993).
The debtor had a medical practice operated as a
corporation and formed a second corporation, ostensibly to
provide services and equipment for the debtor’s corporation.
However, the court held that the second corporation was a
sham formed only to hide assets from the IRS and creditors.
The court held that the debtor’s conduct was a willful
attempt to evade taxes such that the debtor’s tax liability
was nondischargeable. In re Haimes, 173 B.R. 777 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1994), on rem. from 146 B.R. 298 (S.D. Fla.
1992).
DISMISSAL. The debtor filed five bankruptcy cases,
each filed soon after the IRS attempted to collect tax
deficiencies owed by the debtor.  Each of the first four cases
was dismissed for failure to comply with the court’s orders
or for failure to file a plan. The debtor continued to not file
income tax returns during the several cases in spite of
specific orders by the court to do so. The IRS moved to have
the last case dismissed with prejudice. The court held that
the case was dismissed for bad faith filing and prohibited
the debtor from filing another case for two years without
prior consent of the court. In re Gros, 173 B.R. 774
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
SETOFF. The IRS had filed a claim for pre-petition
taxes owed by the debtor and had objected to the plan until
the debtor demonstrated that income tax returns had been
filed. After the debtor’s Chapter 11 plan was confirmed, the
debtor filed an amendment to the asset schedules to include
a pre-petition tax year refund. The IRS filed a motion for
relief from the automatic stay to offset the refund. The court
found that the IRS was entitled to the setoff under
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law, but the debtor argued
that because the plan had already been confirmed, the IRS
was prohibited from setting off the refund and was required
to accept payments as provided by the plan. The court held
that a creditor’s right of setoff is not affected by the
confirmation of the plan but is only subject to the automatic
stay.  The court also held that the IRS’s right of setoff was
sufficient cause to grant relief from the automatic stay.  In
re Whitaker, 173 B.R. 359 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].*  The
debtors borrowed money from a Farm Credit Bank for the
purchase of a ranch and granted the FCB a mortgage on the
property. The debtors did not live on the ranch and defaulted
on the loan payments after three years of natural disasters.
The FCB recalled the debtors’ FCB stock and applied the
value to the loan and instituted foreclosure proceedings. The
debtors applied for debt restructuring but were turned down.
The trial court granted the FCB summary judgment for
foreclosure and any deficiency after sale of the property.
The debtors argued that the summary judgment was
improper because (1) the FCB had violated the Farm Credit
Act provisions and regulations in denying the restructuring
application, (2) the FCB improperly recalled the debtors’
FCB stock, (3) the FCB was not entitled to a deficiency
under Mont. Code § 71-1-232 because the loan was a
purchase money mortgage, and (4) the debtors were entitled
to retain possession of the ranch during the redemption
period. The court held that the summary judgment was
proper because (1) the debtors failed to demonstrate any
violation of the Farm Credit Act by the FCB, (2) the FCB
stock was recalled pursuant to the regulations allowing
recall after a default, (3) the mortgage was not a purchase
money mortgage because the debtors did not buy the ranch
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from the FCB, and (4) the debtors were not entitled to retain
possession of the ranch because the ranch was not used as
the debtors’ residence. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v.
Hill, 879 P.2d 1158 (Mont. 1993).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff’s decedent
was employed by a tree service and was exposed to
pesticides manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff
claimed that the decedent died from exposure to the
pesticides and sued the defendant on theories of (1) failure
to warn, (2) inadequate labeling, (3) inadequate testing, (4)
failure to comply with FIFRA, (5) strict liability, (6) breach
of express warranty, and (7) breach of implied warranty.
The defendant argued that all state tort actions were
preempted by FIFRA because each action could have some
influence on how the products should be labeled, an area
completely covered by FIFRA. The court agreed that the
first two causes of action were preempted because they
specifically involved the labeling requirements for the
pesticides. However, the court held that the claim of
inadequate testing was not preempted by FIFRA. The court
also held that the claim of failure to comply with FIFRA
was not preempted by FIFRA if the state law recognizes a
violation of FIFRA as an actionable tort. The plaintiff’s
strict liability claim was based on allegations that the
pesticides were unreasonably dangerous for their intended
use and that the defective nature of the products could not
be determined upon reasonable inspection. The court held
that this claim was not preempted by FIFRA because the
claim was not based on a defective warning. Although the
express warranty claim involved information contained on
the labels, the court held that the claim was not preempted
by FIFRA because the express warranties were voluntarily
placed on the labels by the defendant. The defendant argued
that because the warranties were approved by the EPA, the
warranties were controlled by FIFRA. The court held that
EPA approval of the warranties was not sufficient to bring
the warranties under FIFRA protection since the warranties
were not required by FIFRA or the EPA. The court
dismissed the plaintiff's implied warranty claim, however,
because the claim would be based on information about the
pesticide on the label; therefore, the claim was preempted
by FIFRA.  Higgins v. Monsanto Co., 862 F.Supp. 751
(N.D. N.Y. 1994).
The plaintiff owned a peach orchard on which a
fungicide manufactured by the defendant was used. The
EPA had found that the fungicide was contaminated with an
herbicide by a contractor hired by the defendant to
manufacture the fungicide. The EPA also found that the
fungicide was distributed at three times the strength listed
on the label, further increasing the harm done by the
contamination. The plaintiff alleged that the fungicide was
also improperly packaged to allow air to reach the product
causing toxins to develop. Thus, the plaintiff sued the
defendant for damages to the orchard based on theories of
(1) inaccurate labels, (2) improper packaging, (3) breach of
express warranties, (4) breach of implied warranties, and (5)
violation of FIFRA. The defendant argued that FIFRA
preempted the state court actions because the claims were
all based on the labels and packaging. Although the court
recognized that state court actions based on labeling were
preempted by FIFRA, the court held that where a plaintiff
has shown that the defendant had violated FIFRA in failing
to inform the EPA of the contamination and inaccurate
labels, the defendant was estopped from claiming FIFRA
preemption. The court reasoned that without such estoppel,
manufacturers could cause great harm without fear of
punishment. The court noted that the regulation of pesticides
under FIFRA depended exclusively on the truthfulness of
the information provided to the EPA by the manufacturers;
therefore, loss of preemption of state tort claims was a fair
exchange for failure to inform the EPA of problems with a
pesticide.  The court also held that the express warranty
claims were not preempted by FIFRA because the warranty
claims were voluntarily placed on the labels, but that the
implied warranty claims were preempted. Roberson v. E.I.




GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* A trust was established in 1917 for the taxpayer
with a remainder to the taxpayer’s children. The trust
provided that if the taxpayer became incompetent, any
principal which would be distributable to the taxpayer was
to be accumulated and the trust income was to be paid only
for the support of the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s issue. If
the taxpayer regained competency, the undistributed
principal and income were to be distributed to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer’s children petitioned the state court to have the
taxpayer declared incompetent and to interpret the trust to
allow the trustee to distribute all trust income to the
taxpayer’s children and grandchildren while the taxpayer
was incompetent.  The IRS interpreted the trust as allowing
distributions of income during the taxpayer’s incompetency
only for the support of the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s
children, given the children’s sources of other income and
need for the funds. Therefore, because a state court ruling in
favor of the trust interpretation suggested by the taxpayer’s
children would allow distribution of all income, would
allow distribution to the taxpayer’s children without
consideration of need, and would allow distribution to the
taxpayer’s grandchildren, the trust revision would
substantially change the beneficiaries’ interests in the trust.
The IRS ruled that such a change in the beneficial interests
would subject the trust to GSTT. The ruling is under
reconsideration. Ltr. Rul. 9448024, Aug. 31, 1994.
INTEREST. In order to avoid sale of estate assets, the
estate borrowed money for payment of federal estate and
state inheritance taxes and secured the loan with estate
assets. The loan and interest payments would be paid over
several years past the limitation date for refunds. The IRS
ruled that because the interest payments were not incurred
as part of a trade or business, investment, passive activity,
personal residence or installment payment of estate tax, the
interest was not deductible on the estate income tax return.
The interest was deductible as an estate administrative
expense if the loan was necessary to avoid sale of assets, a
factual determination not ruled upon by the IRS. The IRS
ruled that if the interest was deductible as an administrative
expense, the estate could preserve its right to future refunds
by filing Form 843 and making a protective claim and then
filing Form 843 each year for the refund claim. The
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requirements for filing Form 843 are set forth in Rev. Rul.
83-15, 1983-1 C.B. 224.   Ltr. Rul. 9449011, Sept. 9, 1994.
VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[3].* The taxpayer owned
five shares of stock in a housing cooperative which entitled
the taxpayer to the use of one lot in the cooperative as a
vacation residence. The taxpayer transferred the shares to a
20-year trust for the benefit of the taxpayer. The trust
provided that if the property became other than a qualified
personal residence, the trustee was to convert the principal
to a qualified annuity within 30 days.  The trust also
provided that the trust was to pay all of the income to the
taxpayer and to pay the taxpayer an amount equal to the
additional federal income taxes incurred by the taxpayer
because of the trust income. The trust corpus passed to the
taxpayer’s children at the end of the 20 years but if the
taxpayer died before the 20 years had passed, the property
passed as appointed by the taxpayer’s will.  The IRS ruled
that the taxpayer would be treated as the owner of the trust
and entitled to deductions for mortgage interest, taxes and
other deductions applicable to the real estate. The IRS also
ruled that the trust interest in the cooperative housing unit
was a qualified personal residence trust and qualified for the
exception to the I.R.C. § 2702 valuation rules. The IRS
ruled that the transfer of the contingent interest to the
remainder holders was a completed gift valued under I.R.C.
§ 7520 as the fair market value of the cooperative housing
unit less the value of the retained income interest in the
property plus the present value of the taxpayer’s retained
contingent reversion interest in the property. The taxpayer
occasionally allowed friends and guests to use the unit
without rent. The IRS ruled that this use of the property
would not disqualify the unit as a qualified personal
residence for valuation purposes.  Ltr. Rul. 9448035, Sept.
2, 1994.
The taxpayer owned all of the shares of stock in a
corporation and simultaneously transferred an equal share of
all the stock to the taxpayer’s 11 children. The stock had no
sale or other restrictions. The issue was whether the stock
was to be valued on a per gift basis or on the basis of the fair
market value of all of the stock as held by the taxpayer just
prior to the gifts. The IRS ruled that the gifts were to be
valued separately with several factors involved in
determining the value for gift tax purposes: (1) the minority
discount (see Moore v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1991-546), (2)
the fact that a willing buyer of a donee’s share would
consider the family relationship of the other owners, (3)
marketability of the stock, and (4) financial and other data
concerning the corporation. Ltr. Rul. 9449001, March 11,
1994.
The taxpayer established a short term grantor annuity
trust with increasing percentages of trust principal to be paid
as the annuity. The annuity payments were to be made first
from income and then from principal, with any excess
income accumulated as principal. The grantor had the power
to revoke a remainder interest in the spouse who would
receive the trust if the grantor died before the trust
terminated. At the termination of the trust, the grantor’s
spouse received a lifetime income interest in the trust. The
spouse also had the power to withdraw principal. If the total
net income and capital gains for the trust exceeded the
annuity amount, the trust was to reimburse the grantor for
the additional taxes incurred. The IRS ruled that (1) the
grantor was the owner of the trust, (2) the grantor’s spouse
would be considered the owner of the trust after the death of
the grantor, (3) no gain of loss would be recognized from
the transfer of property to the trust or the transfer of the trust
to the spouse, (4) the grantor had a qualified annuity interest
in the trust for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702, (5) establishment
of the trust did not constitute a completed gift of the
remainder to the spouse because the grantor retained the
power to revoke the spouse’s interest, (6) the value of the
gift to the remainder beneficiaries equaled the fair market
value of the trust assets less the value of the grantor’s
retained interest plus the value of the spouse’s interest, and
(7) if the grantor died before revoking the spouse’s interest,
the value of the interest passing to the spouse qualified for
the marital deduction.  Ltr. Rul. 9449012, Sept. 9, 1994;




DEBT INSTRUMENTS. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations governing the tax treatment of corporate debt
instruments which provide for one or more contingent
payments. The proposed regulations also provide for
integration of a contingent payment or variable rate debt
instrument with a related hedge. 59 Fed. Reg. 64884 (Dec.
16, 1994).
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The IRS has
issued tables, revised for inflation, detailing the limitation
on depreciation deductions for automobiles first placed in
service during 1995:
   Tax Year      Amount  
1st tax year ........................................... $3,060
2d tax year ..............................................4,900
3d tax year ..............................................2,950
Each succeeding year ............................. 1,775
The IRS also issued tables providing the amounts to be
included in income for automobiles first leased during 1995.
Rev. Proc. 95-9, I.R.B. 1995-2.
EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS. The IRS has issued
proposed regulations governing the eligibility of reimbursed
working condition fringe benefits for exclusion from an
employee’s gross income where the benefits are not
deductible in full or part by the employer. Specifically, the
proposed regulations allow reimbursed meal and
entertainment expenses which qualify as working condition
fringes to be excluded even though the employer may only
deduct 50 percent of such expenses. The same rule applies
for club memberships and payment of travel expenses of an
employee’s spouse. 59 Fed. Reg. 64909 (Dec. 16, 1994).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The debtor owned a
farm which was used to raise feed crops for cattle and to
breed and train horses. The debtor formed an S corporation
and transferred two horses and tack to the corporation. The
corporation also leased other horses, equipment and real
property from the debtor; however, the debtor failed to
formally have the corporation pay rent to the debtor for two
years.  The debtor testified that the only purpose of the
corporation was to limit the debtor’s liability for a portion of
the farming operation and that the debtor did not consider
the corporation's activities as separate from the debtor’s
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operation of the rest of the farming operations. The IRS,
however, treated the rental activity as a separate business
and denied all deductions in excess of rental income (which
was zero for at least two years as noted above) because the
rental activity was not operated for profit. The court cited
Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(d) as providing factors for
determining whether activities are separate for purposes of
I.R.C. § 183. The court focused on two factors: (1) “the
degree of organizational and economic interrelationship of
various undertakings” and (2) “the business purpose which
is (or might be) served by carrying on the various
undertakings separately or together in a trade or business.”
The court held that because the debtor treated the activities
of the S corporation and the debtor’s own farming
operations as one operation and because the S corporation
was formed only to limit the debtor’s nontax liabilities, the
two activities would be treated as one for purposes of
determining whether the debtor operated the farm for profit.
The court rejected the IRS argument, based on Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1994), that the IRS could hold the
debtor to the separate business structures formed. The court
held that the purpose of Section 183 was not served by
holding the debtor to the separate entities as separate
activities because the debtor was not attempting to use the
deductions from the S corporation’s farming activities to
offset a larger unrelated income. Although the ruling
provides comfort for the many farms and ranches using a
separate entity for land and equipment ownership, the
precedential value of the ruling may be tainted by the
court’s desire to relieve the debtor from a tax liability large
enough to prevent a successful bankruptcy reorganization.
In re Wilhelm, 173 B.R. 398 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1994).
The taxpayer was a lawyer who also owned farm
property on which the taxpayer conducted horse raising,
hunting and various farming activities. The court held that
the taxpayer could deduct losses in excess of income from
the farm because (1) the taxpayer had an honest expectation
of profit from the appreciation of the property, (2) the
taxpayer operated the farm in a business-like manner by
consulting experts and (3) the taxpayer expended 500-700
hours a year on managing the farm activities. Hoyle v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-592.
HOME OFFICE-ALM § 4.03[13].* A medical doctor
was not allowed deductions for a home office used to
maintain the taxpayer's records because the home office was
not where the taxpayer performed the principal tasks of the
taxpayer’s business, which was at hospitals and clinics.
Salih v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-627.
INTEREST. The taxpayer received installment
payments of the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The
unpaid amounts accrued interest which was paid to the
taxpayer. The court held that, although the insurance
proceeds were excludible from income, the interest earned
by the retained proceeds was taxable income. Rivera v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-625.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY. The taxpayer
was a partner in a partnership which purchased several
feature motion pictures for cash plus a note. The note was to
be paid from the licensing fees paid by television networks
for broadcast of the movies. The court held that the
partnership's basis in the movies could not be increased by
the amount of the note because the note was to be paid from
the fees and the parties had no intention of enforcing the
obligation if the fees were insufficient. Segal v. Comm’r,
94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,621 (7th Cir. 1994), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1992-390.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The IRS has
ruled that a business organized under the Connecticut
Limited Liability Act could be taxed as a corporation or
partnership, but would be taxed as a partnership if (1) the
articles of organization restricted the transferability of
interests and required the dissolution of the company upon
termination of a member’s interest unless all members
agreed to continue the company and (2) the articles of
organization provided for management by elected members
of the organization. Rev. Rul. 94-79, I.R.B. 1994-51, 7.
PENALTIES. The IRS has issued a revised revenue
procedure for identifying circumstances under which the
disclosure on a taxpayer’s return of a position on an item is
adequate for the purpose of reducing the understatement of
income tax penalty of I.R.C. § 6662(d) and for the purpose
of avoiding the preparer penalty of I.R.C. § 6694(a). The
major change involved changing the discussion of moving
expenses which are now adjustments to income.   Rev.
Proc. 94-74, I.R.B. 1994-51, 11, revising Rev. Rul. 94-36,
1994-1 C.B. 682.
PENSION PLAN. The taxpayer received a lump sum
distribution from a pension plan which had become
unqualified because of a failure to make changes required
by statutory changes. The court held that the lump sum
distribution was not eligible for ten-year averaging because
the pension plan was unqualified at the time of the
distribution. Meyers v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-598.
A corporation entered into deferred compensation
agreements with several top executives. The agreements
also provided for interest to accrue on the deferred
compensation amounts and the corporation claimed a
deduction for the interest that accrued each taxable year.
The Tax Court had denied the deductions, reasoning that the
interest was subject to the corporation’s ability to pay and
the interest rate would increase if the corporation’s ability to
pay decreased, thus producing larger deductions at a time
when the corporation was least likely to pay the interest.
The appellate court initially held that the interest was
deductible because the agreements were bona fide and
legally binding on the corporation and the interest
represented the time value of the deferred compensation.
However, on reconsideration, the appellate court upheld the
Tax Court ruling. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Comm’r, 38 F.3d
1046 (9th Cir. 1994), vac’g, 12 F.3d 1529 (9th Cir. 1993),
rev’g, 95 T.C. 415 (1990).
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX-ALM § 4.06.*   The
plaintiff rented tobacco crop land under a sharecrop
arrangement. The plaintiff assisted the tenants financially by
advancing some of the costs of production. One of the costs
was the hiring of day laborers to work for the tenants. The
plaintiff paid for all of this labor and deducted the amounts
from the tenants’ shares after harvest.  The plaintiff did not
withhold from the laborers’ compensation and pay any
amounts for social security or federal unemployment taxes.
The plaintiff argued that the compensation was exempt from
such withholding because of the sharecrop leases. The court
held that the exception only applied as between the tenants
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and the plaintiff and not the laborers since no sharecrop
arrangement was made as to the laborers. The court also
held that the plaintiff was liable for the withholding because
the plaintiff was in the best position to withhold and pay the
taxes.  Because the plaintiff paid over $20,000 in wages in a
calendar quarter in a single tax year, the plaintiff also was
liable for unemployment taxes on the wages paid.
Winstead v. U.S., 863 F.Supp. 264 (M.D. N.C. 1994).
The taxpayer was an insurance salesman who entered
into a termination agreement with the insurance company
that provided for payments after termination of
employment. The amount of the payments was contingent
upon (1) the return of all insurance company property within
10 days after termination, (2) the taxpayer’s agreement not
to sell competing insurance for at least one year after
termination, (3) the amount of insurance sales by the
taxpayer within one year before termination, and (4) the
number of continuing policy holders after the termination.
The court held that the termination payments were not self-
employment income because the payments did not derive
from the sale of insurance but derived from the termination
agreement. The court found that the payment amounts were
linked to the taxpayer’s sales but that the payments were not
a form of deferred compensation because the taxpayer was
fully compensated for the sales during employment.  In
addition, the payments were contingent upon factors beyond
the taxpayer's control, such as the number of policies
continued after termination of employment. Milligan v.
Comm’r, 38 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1994).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
January 1995
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 7.19 7.07 7.01 6.97
110% AFR 7.93 7.78 7.71 7.66
120% AFR 8.66 8.48 8.39 8.33
Mid-term
AFR 7.92 7.77 7.70 7.65
110% AFR 8.73 8.55 8.46 8.40
120% AFR 9.54 9.32 9.21 9.14
Long-term
AFR 8.17 8.01 7.93 7.88
110% AFR 9.00 8.81 8.72 8.65
120% AFR 9.84 9.61 9.50 9.42
NEGLIGENCE
UNDERGROUND TANK. In 1966 the plaintiff leased
an underground gas storage tank from a gas dealer who
installed the tank on the plaintiff’s farm. The gas dealer had
borrowed money from the defendant bank and had granted a
security interest in the tank as collateral for the loan. The
gas dealer defaulted on the loan and transferred all
collateral, including the tank, to the bank. The plaintiff had
stopped using the tank but the tank and pump remained on
the property. The bank informed the plaintiff that the tank
had been transferred to the bank and offered to sell the tank
and pump to the plaintiff who refused the offer. The bank
retrieved only the pump and left the tank in place. The
plaintiff’s drinking water became polluted from leaking gas
from the tank and the state Department of Natural Resources
requested the plaintiff to cleanup the damage to the
environment and to stop drinking the water. The plaintiff
sued the bank for negligent possession. The bank argued
that it never had possession sufficient for liability for
negligence. The court held that the bank’s acceptance of
title to the tank, correspondence with the plaintiff that the
tank had been transferred to the bank and the repossession
of the pump demonstrated that the bank had possession of
the tank sufficient for liability to the plaintiff for negligent
possession. The trial court had reduced the jury award of
$250,000 for the cost of repair to $49,000 for the diminution
in the plaintiff’s property value. The court held that
although the general rule was that a plaintiff could receive
the lesser of the diminution of property value or repair costs,
the repair costs were allowable in this case because the
repairs involved a public interest in a clean environment and
the repairs were required by state law. Nischke v. Farmers
& Merchants Bank & Trust, 522 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. App.
1994).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
HERBICIDE. The plaintiff operated a greenhouse
which was located next to the businesses of the defendants.
One defendant operated a crop spraying business (the
sprayer) and the other defendant operated an elevator (the
elevator) which sold herbicides. The plaintiff discovered
that its soil pile, used to provide soil for the greenhouse, had
become contaminated with several growth-inhibiting
herbicides. Because the sprayer parked its tanks near the
pile, the first suspected source of the contamination was
from leaking tanks. The plaintiff and sprayer reached a
settlement requiring the sprayer to make a cash payment and
to testify against the elevator. In the suit against the
elevator, the affidavits of experts and employees
demonstrated that the elevator did not have any of its
growth-inhibiting herbicides near the plaintiff’s property
and summary judgment was granted for the elevator. The
plaintiff appealed that ruling, arguing that the sprayer would
testify that some herbicide bags were blowing around from
the elevator. The court upheld the summary judgment for
the elevator, holding that the sprayer’s testimony was
insufficient to contradict the affidavits from the elevator.
The plaintiff also attempted to sue the sprayer for
negligence but the court held that the settlement agreement
was binding and limited the plaintiff’s recovery to the
settlement amount. Vandal v. Peavy Co., 523 N.W.2d 266
(N.D. 1994).
ZONING
AGRICULTURAL USE.  The plaintiff owned land
locally zoned as agricultural-residential. The zoning
ordinance allowed eight specific uses of right, including
agricultural use. The ordinance defined agricultural use as
the harvesting of crops, raising of livestock, operating an
orchard, selling of farm produce on the premises where
raised, and the processing or storage of products raised on
the property. The plaintiff wanted to extract water from the
aquifer beneath the property for sale as bottled water and
applied for a conditional permit for use of the property to
bottle water. The town rejected the application and the
plaintiff appealed, arguing that the extraction and bottling of
water on the premises met the definition of agricultural use.
The court held that the extraction of water did not meet any
of the definitions of agricultural use in the zoning ordinance
16                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
or other state laws; therefore, the denial was proper.





The plaintiff owned land designated as forest land. The
plaintiff used a portion of the land as a Christmas tree farm.
The plaintiff wanted to use additional portions of the land
for the Christmas tree business but needed to level a hill in
order to make use of the land. The plaintiff proposed
removing 300,000 to 400,000 cubic yards of soil from the
area, using a portion of the soil to restore a cranberry bog
and retaining the top soil for cultivation of the trees to be
planted in the leveled area. The zoning for the land allowed
agricultural uses but prohibited removing “significant
amounts of earth.” The town denied the plaintiff’s
application to level the hill, stating that the soil removal
violated the zoning ordinance. The Appeals Court held that
the leveling of the hill and soil removal were incidental to
the agricultural use and were, therefore, a permitted
agricultural use of the land. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the gravel removal was not incidental because
the removal was not minor nor was the removal reasonably
related to the growing of Christmas trees. Henry v. Bd. of
Appeals of Dunstable, 641 N.E.2d 1334 (Mass. 1994),
rev’g, 627 N.E.2d 484 (Mass. Ct. App. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Metzger v. Comm’r, 38 F.3d 118 (4th Cir.
1994), aff’g, 100 T.C. 204 (1993) (gift) see Vol. 5 p. 148.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, updates will be billed at $35 each in 1995.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.





  Avoidable liens 10











Federal Estate and Gift Tax











Basis of partnership property 14
Limited liability companies 14
Penalties 14
Pension plan 14
 Social security tax 14
Safe harbor interest rates
January 1995  15
Negligence
Underground tank 15
Products Liability
Herbicide 15
Zoning
Agricultural use 15
